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EQUITABLE SERVITUDES AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Any attempt at discussion of the applicability of the statute of
frauds to equitable servitudes upon land brings us to what Justice
Cardozo has described as "one of the battlefields of the law."' Professor Reno introduces a short discussion of the problem with this
statement: "One of the most difficult problems presented to the courts
for solution is the extent to which the various statutes of frauds are
applicable to equitable servitudes."'
It is not to be expected that any definitive answer to the numerous
problems presented will be reached herein, but we may outline the
ways in which the problem can be approached and examine a few
of the cases illustrative of these views.
The problem arises, usually, in one of two ways: (1) the agreement purporting to create the servitude is oral;3 and (2) the common
grantor, in making sales of lots in a subdivision subject to express
restrictions, orally agrees that the remaining lots will be sold subject
to the same restrictions but then sells some of the remaining lots
without any such restrictions to purchasers with notice.4
It can readily be seen that in either of the situations described
the restriction, or "equitable servitude," which the plaintiff would be
attempting to enforce is one which must depend for its very existence
upon an oral agreement - unless, of course, in the second instance a
general building scheme can be found to exist on the basis of those
lots sold with deeds containing express restrictions. Are we to allow
this oral agreement to create a "servitude" upon the land unsupported
by any written contract, or are we to regard it as coming within the
statute of frauds and therefore unenforceable? The answer depends
very largely upon the method of approach to the problem and, indeed, upon the very definition of the term "equitable servitude."
There is little or no general agreement as to the nature, origin, operation, or enforceability of this anomalous type of restriction on the
use of land. An analysis of its nature and scope of operation would
'Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 287, 167 N.E. 441, 445 (1929).
2The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part II, 28 VA. L. REv.
1067, 1090 (1942).
3Cf. Miller v. Babb, 263 S.W. 253 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924); Florsheim v.
Reinberger, 173 Wis. 150, 179 N.W. 793 (1921).
4Cf. Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1913); Ham v. Massasoit
Real Estate Co., 42 R.I. 293, 107 Atl. 205 (1919).
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seem essential in order to determine the question of its enforceability
generally, and more particularly as relating to the applicability of the
statute of frauds.
A brief glance at the English Statute of Frauds5 and the various
modifications of this statute found in all of the states shows that they
contain separate sections which may be applicable: the first section
relating to conveyances of interests in land and the fourth to executory
contracts. Under the fourth section two subsections may be relevant:
one relating to executory contracts for the sale of an interest in land,
and the other relating to agreements not capable of performance
within one year.
The problem may be approached in two ways: (1) an equitable
servitude is a property interest in the nature of an equitable easement; or (2) it is a purely contractual obligation. A search of numerous cases decided in recent years reveals that there is a wide variation among the states as to what is or is not an "interest in land," and
as to whether restrictive covenants involve any such interest.6 There
529 CAR. II, c. 8 (1677).

6Statute of frauds protects equitable estates in land as well as legal, Coleman
v. Coleman, 48 Ariz. 337, 61 P.2d 441 (1936).
An agreement restricting use of land is not a "personal agreement" but is an
"agreement in rem" and must be in writing in order to be enforceable, Droutman
v. The E. M. & L. Garage, Inc., 129 NJ. Eq. 1, 19 A.2d 25 (Ch.), afrd, 129 N.J.

Eq. 545 (Ct. Err. &App. 1941).
The servitude imposed by restrictive covenants is a species of "incorporeal
right" which restrains the owner of the servient estate from making certain use
of his property, and it is an "interest in land," conveyance of which is within
the statute of frauds, so that such restraint may not be effectively imposed except
by deed or other writing duly registered, Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E.2d
197 (1942).
The term "interest in land" as used in the statute of frauds means some portion
of title or right of possession and does not include agreements which may affect
land but which do not contemplate transfer of any title, ownership, or possession.
Carter v. McCall, 193 S.C. 456, 8 S.E.2d 844 (1940).
A right granted a person to hunt on grantor's premises is not a mere "license,"
but an interest in real estate in the nature of an "incorporeal hereditament," and
hence within the statute of frauds, so as to require writing for its creation, Anderson v. Gipson, 144 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
Where restrictions forbidding the erection of any building except single-family
residences were included in deeds to various purchasers of lots in a certain addition
and the restrictions were for the benefit of all land in the addition, the restrictive
covenants were not within the statute of frauds, Reeves v. Morris, 155 Kan. 231,
124 P.2d 488 (1942).
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are many holdings on the point which treat the problem generally,
but few of these contain any fine analysis of the reasoning behind
the rule.
The two approaches previously suggested have been referred to
in various ways, for example, the Norcross v. James view7 as opposed
to the Hodge v. Sloan views or "Stone's" view; 9 but for convenience
they are referred to hereinafter as the property theory and the contract
theory, respectively. The remainder of this discussion is divided into
two parts in which these theories or approaches are considered in more
detail, with particular emphasis on the latter, since the general trend
seems to be in that direction.
The Property Theory. When we approach the problem upon the
theory that equitable servitudes are property interests in the nature
of equitable easements, there really is not much of a problem: the
result is pretty nearly a foregone conclusion. It is evident the first
section of the statute of frauds would be applicable, and an oral agreement could not operate to create an enforceable servitude against
subsequent possessors of the burdened land; nor, indeed, would it
seem that such an agreement would be enforced against the original
covenantor - for if an interest is transferred by the agreement is it
not transferred when the contract is made? If a property interest is
regarded as the basis for enforcement, it would seem that there is no
better reason to enforce the restriction against the original party to
the agreement than against subsequent assignees of the land. Most
of the cases in which the issue has been expressly decided on this basis
seem to have reached the almost inevitable conclusion that the first
section of the statute of frauds renders the restriction unenforceable.1o
A building iestriction is a negative easement and cannot be shown by parol,
being within the statute of frauds, Pepper v. West End Devel. Co., 211 N.C. 166,
189 S.E. 628 (1937).
An easement or servitude is "an interest in land" and hence cannot be treated
other than by an instrument in writing, under the statute, Monk v. Danna, 110
S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
7Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
SHodge v. Sloan, 107 N.Y. 244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887).
9Stone, The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 COL.
L. REv. 291 (1918).
SOE.g., Scheuer v. Britt, 217 Ala. 196, 115 So. 237 (1928); Sprague v. Kimball, 213
Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1913); Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 66 N.H. 360, 20 At. 979
(1890); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925); Miller v. Babb, 263

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss1/8

4

Thompson: Equitable Servitudes and the Statute of Frauds
NO TES
Reno, however, raises this point:"1 Even though an oral agreement
cannot operate as a conveyance of an equitable servitude, can it perhaps be construed to be an executory contract for the creation of a
valid equitable servitude in the future? This view would seem to be
particularly felicitous in the "subdivision" cases in which the oral
agreement is a promise by a common grantor, made at the time of earlier sales of lots subject to express restrictions, that the remaining lots
will be sold subject to the same restrictions. An immediate objection
to this possible solution is seen, however, in the provisions of the
fourth section of the statute in the subsection dealing with executory
contracts for the creation of interests in land. Thus this executory
contract, if we view it as such, would be unenforceable, just as a
servitude created by parol. There is a possibility, however, that in
some cases, if this view were used, the equitable doctrine of part performance12 could be applied to take the case out of the statute.1 3
The argument has been advanced in several cases that this equitable doctrine of part performance should be applied in the "subdivision" cases previously mentioned, since the earlier purchasers
have purchased lots in reliance upon the oral promise of the common
grantor, paid their consideration in full, and have in many cases built
permanent improvements upon their lots in reliance upon the restrictions. It is to be noted, however, that in all of these cases the courts
have denied the claim that improvements erected upon the purchaser's
own lot and money paid as consideration for such land can be treated
as evidence of an oral agreement to impose a burden upon the remaining lands of the common grantor.14 In this connection we must
S.M. 253 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924); Florsheim v. Reinberger, 173 Wis. 150, 179
NAV. 793 (1921).

l-Supra note 2, at 1090.

12E.g., State ex rel. Wirt v. Superior Ct., 10 Wash.2d 362, 116 P.2d 752 (1941).
131t is well settled that part performance of a verbal contract within the

statute of frauds has no effect at law to take the case out of the statute. In
equity, however, where the verbal contract relates to the sale of land the rule is
otherwise, upon the ground that it would be a fraud upon the party who, in
reliance upon the contract and pursuant thereto, has partly performed it, to permit the other party to refuse performance. This doctrine is applied under actions
for specific performance, and the agreements must be such as would have been
susceptible to a decree of specific performance had they been in writing. SMrrT,
TnE

4

LAW OF FRAUDS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

§349 (1907).

E.g., Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1913); Ham v. Massasoit Real Estate Co., 42 R.I. 293, 107 At. 205 (1919).
l
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remember that the doctrine is applicable only when the acts of part
performance are done in reliance upon and pursuant to the alleged
oral agreement. These holdings are consistent with the majority view
that the doctrine of part performance must be limited in its application to acts which are solely explainable by reference to the oral contract.
Some states, however, have extended the applicability of the doctrine of part performance so that it will include any acts made in reliance upon the oral contract which would lead to irreparable injury
if the contract were not enforced. 15 If this view is taken, it is seen
that part performance comes very close to being a part of the doctrine
of equitable estoppel. This, Reno says, 16 is probably the explanation
of the New York cases, which, after admitting that an equitable servitude is a property interest within the terms of the statute of frauds,
have then proceeded to enforce oral agreements upon the basis of
estoppel.17 He further points out that when a common grantor, in
sales of expressly restricted subdivision lots, has orally promised or
represented that the remaining lots will be similarly restricted, jurisdictions that will not enforce orally created equitable servitudes may
permit enforcement on the ground that there immediately arises an
implied reciprocal servitude against the remaining land. 8 Thus the
application of the statute can be avoided by enforcing not the oral
promise or representation of the common grantor but an implied reciprocal servitude arising from the combination of the express restriction in the purchaser's own deed and the oral promise. 19 Actually
the cases do not discuss the application of the statute; however, this
15See Note, 38 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1925), for a discussion of these two views
as to the nature of the acts sufficient to satisfy the equitable doctrine of part performance.

16Supra note 2.
17Phillips v. West Rockaway Land Co., 226 N.Y. 507, 124 N.E. 87 (1919); Nissen
v. McCafferty, 202 App. Div. 528, 195 N.Y. Supp. 549 (2d Dep't 1922); Bimson v.
Baultman, 3 App. Div. 198, 38 N.Y. Supp. 209 (2d Dep't 1896). But cf. Clanton
v. Scruggs, 95 Ala. 279, 10 So. 757 (1891), expressly denying the applicability of
estoppel for the reason that the doctrine can have no application to a breach of
a promise.
18E.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925); Tallmadge v.
East River Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1863); Lawrence v. Woods, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 233,
118 S.W. 551 (1909); Spicer v. Martin, 14 App. Cas. 12 (1888).
19Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911) (court specifically pointed
out the fact that the common grantor's representations were oral).
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can be justified under the view that the reciprocal servitude is implied
20
from the express written restrictions upon the purchaser's own land.
Since the deed was signed by the common grantor, the statute of frauds
is satisfied.
In Snow v. Van Dam2 1 the lower court awarded a decree to plaintiff enjoining the defendants' erection of a large building to be used
for the sale of ice cream and dairy products as being in violation of
restrictions limiting the use of the property to residential purposes. A
group of lots in a tract had been sold at various times by the general
owner of the tract to various persons, the deeds containing, with negligible exceptions, a uniform set of restrictions, the material one being
a stipulation that only one dwelling house should be erected or
maintained on each lot at any given time, with further provisions as
to minimum cost of the dwellings and the maintenance of certain appurtenances thereto. Apparently the deeds were recorded, although
the point was not expressly raised, except that in a later deed it was
held that the deed, and the restrictions contained in it, did not become operative until the date of registration 2 2 of the deed, which was
dated a few days earlier than the date upon which it was registered.
It was held, in accordance with Sprague v. Kimball,23 which was repeatedly cited by the court, that the statute of frauds applied to such
restrictions, although the covenants here were in writing so as to
satisfy the statute. The Massachusetts statute cited in Sprague v.
Kimball24 is in substance the same as Section 1 of the original English
statute of frauds. The existence of a building scheme was discussed,
with extensive citations of authority, as being important to establish
the scope and extent of the restrictions as well as the property that
they were intended to benefit. It was stated, however, that an express
restriction was necessary to burden any particular piece of property,
even though the existence of the scheme could be established where
not every lot was restricted or where there were some variations in
the restrictions. The case lays down no new rules of law and in fact
seems to take a rather narrow view of the effect of the existence of a
20"They [implied reciprocal servitudes] arise, if at all, out of a benefit accorded the land retained by restrictions upon neighboring land sold by a common owner." Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 230, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925).
21291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935).
22MAss. GEN. LAws c. 185, §57 (1932).

23213 Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1913).
24MAss. GEN. L&ws c. 183, §3 (1932).
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general building scheme, but it has some value for the extensive ci2 5

tations contained therein.

This case and many others like it seem to entertain no doubt that
the equitable servitude is an interest in land within the meaning of
the first section of the statute, although at least in this one the existence of the contract theory is recognized, the court citing among other
2 6
cases and writings Bristol v. Woodward.
The Contract Theory. It appears that several courts have used
the contract theory of enforcement of equitable servitudes as a means
of avoiding the obstacle presented by the statute of frauds.2 7 The
argument is advanced in these cases that equity is merely granting
specific performance of a contract, and that therefore no interest or
easement in land within the meaning of the statute is involved.28
It can readily be seen that such an approach completely eliminates
the first section of the English statute, so that it need not even be
considered. It does not, however, necessarily exclude the possibility
of application of the fourth section, relative to executory contracts.
It has previously been noted that two subsections of this latter section may apply, one concerning executory contracts for the sale of any
interest in land and the other dealing with agreements not capable of
performance within one year. It is immediately obvious that the
same argument which eliminates the first section of the English statute
from consideration will also eliminate the subsection formerly mentioned relating to executory contracts for the sale of any interest in
land.
There still remains, however, the provision in another subsection
of the fourth section which requires all executory contracts not to
25The decree of the lower court was affirmed, with the exception of a modification as to the duration of a permanent injunction which had been granted, in
accordance with a peculiar statute limiting the operation of such restrictions upon

land to a period of 30 years.
26251 N.Y. 275, 167 N.E. 441 (1929).
27E.g., Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1925); Hall v. Solomon,
61 Conn. 476, 23 At. 876 (1892); Hegna v. Peters, 199 Iowa 259, 201 N.W. 803
(1925); Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N.Y. 227, 29 N.E. 81 (1891); Johnson v. Mt. Baker
Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 Pac. 536 (1920).
28"An agreement for the sale of an interest in or concerning real estate contemplates a transfer of some portion of the title. An agreement not to carry on
a particular kind of business on certain premises is not an agreement for the
sale of an interest in or concerning said premises." Hall v. Solomon, 61 Conn.

476, 483, 23 Atl. 876, 878 (1892).
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be performed within one year to be evidenced by a written memorandum. If we regard the equitable servitude as merely an executory
contract which is susceptible to a decree of specific performance by a
court of equity against all possessors of the land, then such an agreement still comes within this subsection unless it can be construed to
be capable of performance within one year.20 We find three cases
worthy of note as having discussed the applicability of this subsection
in applying the contract theory to the problem of the enforceability
of equitable servitudes.
In Long v. CramerMeat & Packing Co. 3 0 there was a parol understanding by which the tenants in common agreed that they would not
use their lands for the grazing and watering of sheep. The court held
that it was from its nature incapable of performance, or not to be
performed, within a year, "and, resting wholly in parol, did violence
to the statute of frauds, and would not have been specifically enforceable even against the original parties to it."' 1 The decree of the
lower court awarding the plaintiffs an injunction and damages was
reversed and the cause remanded.
The case of Hall v. Solomon3 2 presented the problem of an oral
argument that property should not be used for the sale of intoxicating
liquors. The court affirmed the lower court's decree awarding a
permanent injunction. The first section of the statute earlier referred to was considered, the court holding that no interest in or
concerning land was involved.3 3 Then the court stated: "Nor is it
an agreement not to be performed within one year, under another
clause of the statute. It has been pretty uniformly held that contracts
which may be performed within one year are not within the statute."3 4
The court did not further elaborate or give any reason for its holding
that the contract could be performed within a year. It is obvious
that, as in the preceding case, the agreement was restrictive and un29When no definite time is fixed by the parties for performance of the agreement, and there is nothing in its terms to show that it could not be performed
within a year, according to its intent and the understanding of the parties, it
should not be construed as being within the statute of frauds. Yates v. Ball, 132
Fla. 132, 181 So. 341 (1937); accord, Land v. Cooper, 250 Ala. 271, 34 So.2d 313
(1948); Berger v. Jackson, 156 Fla. 251, 23 So.2d 265 (1945) (oral agreement to
compensate promisee upon promissor's death).
20155 Cal. 402, 101 Pac. 297 (1909).
311d. at 406, 101 Pac. at 298.
3261 Conn. 476, 23 At. 876 (1892).
3SSee note 28 supra.
3461 Conn. 476, 484, 23 AUt. 876, 878 (1892), citing cases.
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limited as to time, so that the only contingency on which the agreement could be performed within one year would be a sufficient change
in the neighborhood so that equity would refuse to enforce it. If this
was the reason for the holding, it is respectfully submitted that this
is a rather weak basis for the decision.
A different and rather novel solution was offered by an early
case 35 in which the court affirmed a judgment of the lower court
awarding the plaintiff damages for breach of the oral agreement in
a special action of assumpsit, upon a plea of non-assumpit. After
discussing the other arguments presented by the defendant, the court
went on to say, with regard to the statute of frauds: 36
"It is too obvious to admit of discussion that the agreement of the plaintiff in error, that the 'Jewel House' should
not be used as a tavern, is not affected by any provision of the
first section of the statute of frauds. That portion of the section
in relation to agreements, which are not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, has been
supposed to be applicable. This enactment extends only to
contracts which are not to be carried into full, effective, and
complete execution within a year from the making thereof; or,
in other words, to cease, in which by the express appointment or
understanding of the parties, the thing is not to be performed
within a year ....

Of necessity, it can be applicable only to af-

firmative contracts, for how can it be held to apply to a negative
contract or stipulation - to a thing not only not to be done
within a year, but not to be done at all, at any time?"
This view may not be too easy to comprehend, since it would
have, it seems, a peculiar effect on any negative contract. But if accepted, affirmative equitable servitudes would still be subject to the
requirements of the statute of frauds even though viewed as contract
rights only; oral restrictive servitudes, however, would be fully enforceable.
Reno, in the article previously cited, 37 comes to the conclusion
that the best answer to the argument that equitable servitudes, even
if treated as not creating any interest in land, still come within the
35

t.einau v. Smart, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 308 (1950).

36d. at 311.
37
Supra note 2.
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subsection as to executory contracts not capable of performance within one year is found in the English doctrine that this subsection does
not apply to unilateral contracts or to bilateral contracts one side of
which has been fully performed within the year.3 8 Equitable servitudes can in most instances be looked at as bilateral contracts in which
the promisee has fully performed his side of the contract. They
usually arise in a sale of land to the promisor or in the sale of land
from the promisor to the promisee; and the promisee will usually
have performed his side of the contract within the year, in the former
case by the conveyance of the burdened land and in the latter by
the payment of the purchase price for the benefited land. Only when
there is no transfer of land but the oral agreement purports to create
mutual equitable servitudes in consideration for each other would
this solution fail. Thus, outside of this last situation, the obstacle
of the statute of frauds to the enforcement of oral agreements purporting to create equitable servitudes can be avoided by approaching
the problem as the enforcement of contract rights only.
Perhaps by way of conclusion it would be only appropriate to
quote again from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Bristol v. Woodward:3 9
"Difficulties there are in either view if the underlying concept is pressed to the limit of its logic....
"We do not need to choose now between these conflicting

methods of approach. ... Each of the two methods will doubtless have contributed a share to the ultimate generalization.
In the end we may find that they have come together so often
and in so many ways that there is no longer space between the
paths, no longer choice to make between them. What began as
a contractual right may be so protected by remedies, legal and
equitable, that it will be indistinguishable from a real interest,
a title to the land itself. What has thus developed into an interest may retain such traces and reminiscenses of its contractual
history that for the purpose of the Statute of Frauds, its quality
will be determined according to its origin ....
"The ultimate generalization is ... for the future."
DONALD

R. THOMPSON

University of Richmond
3sSee

RsrATEziENT, CONTRCTS §198, comment a

(1932).

-9251 N.Y. 275, 288, 167 N.E. 441, 446 (1929).
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